

THE RACE BETWEEN AUTARCHIC STRUC-
TURALISM AND ECUMENICAL CITIZENRY:
AUFHEBUNG WITHOUT RESERVE

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Abstract

Not many, yet proliferating are the contributions within the discipline of international relations (IR) which explicitly dwell upon the question(s) of race and racism. By parting from Hegelian idealism, I argue, in this paper, that a racial and racist structure qua structural necessity underlies the discipline in question as well as (social) science and knowledge more generally. To show how, I rewrite the history of IR as the history of unexpressed race and racism, developing the concept of sublation (*Aufhebung*) as well as the thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectic, in the manner of the Hegelian lord-bondsman dialectic. This paper is not so much an exegesis of Hegel's work, but rather a development in the direction of positing race and racism precisely where one is in order to take them for granted and treat them as *faits accomplis*. Race and racism turn out not so much as circumscribed and situated instances of vehement difference, although the vehemence of difference itself at work. For, races are never (as many), but rather heuristics most aptly straddling the liminality between the promise of self-sufficiency and the necessity of an internalised exteriority.

Keywords: Race, Racism, International Relations, Difference

1. *Introduction*

Writing from the most revolutionary decade of modern times, a prominent critical security studies (CSS) scholar once examined the possibility of baptizing international relations (IR) as a “global moral science”, as follows: «It is too soon in history to say that we cannot have a cosmopolitan self. How can we possibly know, so early in the human race?»¹. At that point in time, the alleged

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¹ K. BOOTH, *Human Wrongs and International Relations*, in «International Affairs», LXXI, 1 (1995), p. 119.

downturn of statism, as it were, more than anything else, seemed to propel the advent of the critique and the critical, inherently charged more with cognitive potential rather than with conative impetus. Today, this cutting-edge question cannot be said to be entirely absent, but neither as dominant. It is crucial therefore to detect whether it is still true that «[t]he enemy of cosmopolitanism is statism [...]»² or a synthetic moment has already been reached. What forms can “the cosmopolitan self” or “the human race” take at all, vis-à-vis whom, how to distinguish them and what does this gesture of differentiation itself tell us about the “global moral science”?

Social sciences have produced many attempts at defining the two notions, including those on phenotypical and socio-historical foundations, but in fact all of the definitions would finish as a by-product of the relational character of racism³. We find these uncomfortable grapplings in the confining field of geopolitics, precisely regarding the geopolitical thought of Rudolf Kjellén, Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer⁴, but not as frequently in the discipline of IR, let alone its branch of security studies (SS) or the sub-branch of CSS. As someone has observed only recently, race and racism much more silently became the warp and weft of the arborescent discipline⁵. However,

² Ivi, pp. 119-120.

³ Cfr. M. OMI, H. WINANT, *Racial formation in the United States: from the 1960s to the 1990s*, Routledge, New York 1994, p. 55. See for instance J. GLASGOW, *A Theory of Race*, Routledge, New York 2009; S. VUCETIC, R.B. PERSAUD, *Race in International Relations*, in *Race, Gender, and Culture in International Relations*, «Postcolonial Perspectives», ed. by R.B. Persaud, A. Sajed, Sage, London 2018; T.W. SCHMID, *The definition of racism*, «Journal of Applied Philosophy», XIII, 1 (1996), p. 34.

⁴ Cfr. P.M. DEFARGES, *Introduzione alla geopolitica*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1994, pp. 31-79; G.Ó. TUATHAIL, *Imperialist geopolitics. Introduction*, in «The Geopolitics Reader», ed. by G.Ó. Tuathail, S. Dalby, P. Routledge, Routledge, London and New York, 1998, pp. 15-26.

⁵ See for instance M. BANTON, *The International Politics of Race*, Polity, Cambridge 2002; P.M. FROWD, *Recentering security studies: Race and the majority world*, in «Security Dialogue», L, 45 (2019), pp. 20-21; E.A. HENDERSON, *Hidden in plain sight: racism in international relations theory*, in «Cambridge Review of International Affairs», XXVI, 1 (2013), pp. 71-92; ID., *The Revolution Will Not Be Theorised: Du Bois, Locke, and the Howard School's Challenge to White Supremacist IR Theory*, «Millennium: Journal of International Studies», XLV, 3 (2017), pp. 492-510; K.

such assessments most often refer to the policy leanings of the early discipline and its role of the ancilla of imperialism, defused with an as early development of the idealistic current and its offshoots⁶. The renaming of one of the first IR journals, namely the 1910 *Journal of Race Development* into *Foreign Affairs* in 1922⁷ speaks volumes of this erstwhile tendency to skim over or even ignore the topic. What we wish to accomplish here instead is to break with the logic of race and racism remaining a *fait accompli* beyond or before (social) science and in particular that of IR and propose at least a couple of nuanced viewpoints covering IR history ever since, all intended to bring the critique and the critical back out of their comfort zone to where they properly belong, neither to the margins of policy nor to self-reflexive dogmatism. As one passage on the current usefulness of the critical to SS reads: «[...] the success of CSS is one of the reasons we suggest that it makes perfect sense to drop the ‘critical’ appendage»⁸. Otherwise said, the critique and the critical warrant their autoimmune nature, although as expected to partially sediment in a normal to and from of any knowledge production.

The aim of this article then turns out to be double: to fill up the (partial) void of race and racism in IR and to do so in an innovative manner. Surely, that «[t]he problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line – the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea»⁹ cannot be stressed enough, but here far more so as the problem of the *line* rather than of the *colour*¹⁰. To that purpose, we draw a (pecked) line between what we call autarchic structuralism and

NISANCIOGLU, *Racial sovereignty*, in «European Journal of International Relations», XXVI, 1 (2020), pp. 1-25.

⁶ Cfr. *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the global colour line*, ed. by A. Anievas, N. Manchanda, R. Shilliam, Routledge, London 2015, p. 2.

⁷ Cfr. R. VITALIS, *The Noble American Science of Imperial Relations and Its Laws of Race Development*, in «Comparative Studies in Society and History», LII, 4 (2010), pp. 928-929.

⁸ N. HYNEK, D. CHANDLER, *No emancipatory alternative, no critical security studies*, in «Critical Studies on Security», I, 1 (2013), p. 46.

⁹ W.E.B. DU BOIS, *The Souls of Black Folk*, Fawcett Publication, Robbinsdale 1961 [1903], p. 23.

¹⁰ L.H.M. LING, *World Politics in Colour*, in «Millennium: Journal of International Studies», XLV, 3 (2017), pp. 473-491.

ecumenical citizenry as two historical manifestations of race in IR prior to their synthetic juncture into a Venn's diagram of the present moment. In the first section, autarchic structuralism translates the realist current in IR into the language of race and racism while further investigating realism's need for structures as a quiesced sympathy towards the concept of race, a minimum common denominator and a prerogative of IR. Here, the lord and the bondsman meet for the first time, summoned by the struggle for survival which nonetheless must fall short of doing away with the other, which, in other words, must survive its own survival. Conversely, the second section is a merger of two human-rights-based IR histories, retracing the advent of the alleged "cosmopolitan self" and "human race", where race inadvertently becomes a potent means to combat nothing less than racism. The plot thickens, the bondsman becomes necessary to the lord in a reinvention of national security, eventually unfolding a complex situation in which lords and bondsmen become utterly confused and omnipresent, in a word self-consciousness of the simultaneous co-existence as subjects and objects. Unless disguised, race and racism eventually become accepted as the entropy of the international system at work, as synonymous with irreprehensible difference with a life of its own.

A gross contribution in the direction of introducing or restoring race and racism as pertinent and even crucial to IR and (social) science more in general may come in the form of absolute idealism, with particular reference to Hegel and his lordship-bondage dialectic (*Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*) as well as sublation (*Aufhebung*)¹¹. Iconically, Hegel writes: «The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing

¹¹ The lordship-bondage dialectic (*Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*) and sublation (*Aufhebung*) derive from two different writings of Hegel's, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977 [1807]) and *The Science of Logic* (2010 [1812]), respectively. More controversially in general as well as for the form and substance of this work, sublation is the preferred translation of *Aufhebung* here, in line with the normally employed translation by James Hutchison Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel: Being the Hegelian System in Origin, Principle, Form and Matter*, Longman, London 1865. Equally controversial may be to indisputably state that sublation refers only to the mentioned work, yet it remains the one in which Hegel dwells upon it most explicitly and with due attention to the term itself within the rich Hegelian glossary.

other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a *result*, that only in the *end* is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself¹². A controversial quote is purportedly chosen, provided that controversy is ever external. On the one hand, the True and the Absolute present themselves as nouns and to-be-defined (TBD) substances¹³; on the other hand, they conceal to-be-continued (TBC) features of their own selves, a negativity to the self which cannot be set aside since it is in itself the essence of existence¹⁴. Here, we do not aim at solving these tensions, nor do we believe it necessary at all. A yet different choice is precisely to preserve the tension in Hegel's work, in any work, in IR itself as work of art, which beyond single topics treated for instance by Hegel is what interests us the most here. As Derrida puts it: «On the one hand, [Hegel] undoubtedly summed up the entire philosophy of the logos. [...] Yet, all that Hegel thought within this horizon [of absolute knowledge], all, that is, except eschatology, may be reread [...] Hegel is also the thinker of irreducible difference»¹⁵. This ceaseless logic of seeking firm ground in the spaceless universe emanates further from the lordship-bondage dialectic (*Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*)¹⁶ and

¹² G.W.F. HEGEL, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A.V. Miller, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1977, p. 11.

¹³ Nuzzo, for instance, remarks the rareness of the use of the Absolute as a noun precisely on this account. See A. NUZZO, The 'Absoluteness' of Hegel's Absolute Spirit, in *Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit: A Critical Guide*, ed. by M.F. Bykova, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2019, pp. 207-224.

¹⁴ Nancy, in particular, makes this point in his innovative reading of Hegel, although the literature going in this direction is not vast. See J.-L. NANCY, *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative*, trans. by S. Miller, J. Smith, Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis 2002 [1997].

¹⁵ See J. DERRIDA, *Of Grammatology*, trans. by G. Chakravorty Spivak, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2016 [1968], pp. 25-28.

¹⁶ Contained within the *Self-Consciousness* chapter of the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, in particular within the section on *Independence and dependence of self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage*. See G.W.F. HEGEL, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, cit., pp. 111-119.

sublation (*Aufhebung*)¹⁷. In the former parable, two abstracts at hand and objectified consciousnesses meet to engage into a relationship, leading to a death struggle (*Kampf*) short of death in that one of the two prevails and subordinates the other, apparently struck between inauthentic or dependent life and the consolatory absence of death. However, as with other twists within the Hegelian idealism, it is only here that the story really begins: not the story of a mere physical encounter and the ensuing domination, but *also and especially* a story of yet another struggle, struggle for (mis)recognition, the real *spiritus movens* of the affair since its very beginning. All of a sudden, the bondsman realises that their dependence upon the lord is affirmed by the negation of the original negative moment of subordination, turning the relationship upside down and ultimately resulting into a self-consciousness which is menaced and inextricably tied to otherness as both independent and dependent, a subject and object. Hegel writes:

A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much 'I' as 'object'. [...] What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is – this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'. It is in self-consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind it the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present¹⁸.

A similar dialectic development we find no less in the logic of sublation, as it were:

This twofold sublation is nonetheless partly only an external event and an alternating of moments in general, and partly still not posited as *one unity*; each of these moves beyond is an independent starting point, a fresh act,

¹⁷ Scattered throughout *The Science of Logic* and crucial to the understanding as much as dependent upon other heuristics within the Hegelian philosophical system, as it were. See G.W.F. HEGEL, *The Science of Logic*, ed. by G. di Giovanni, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.

¹⁸ ID., *Phenomenology of Spirit*, cit., pp. 110-111.

so that the two fall apart. – But, in addition, their *connection* is also present in the infinite progression¹⁹.

In sublation, what *is* never actually is as such, but rather straddles the past and future of a never present moment. Torn between a becoming of being and an infinite becoming, it is the omnipresent progress and non-linear development in one.

Beyond the artefacts of the us vs. them and the overcoming of race and racism either through individual or through collective salvation, the We reveals any us vs. them dialectic as no less than its own consummation at work.

2. Race, Realism, Autarchic Structuralism

It is interesting how the science of IR has never had pure structuralist theory and approach. It has always been considered as a corollary of linguistics and matched with other descriptors to make it suitable for social science use. That is why we have structural realism²⁰, structural idealism²¹, post-structuralism²². Precisely in this structured omission of structuralism lies the principal challenge of IR: what if the structure is racist and racism structural? There were attempts to bridge this, by neophilia – constant pursue of the new solely for the sake of being new²³; modernization as the strict and servile definition of the possible²⁴; various critical concepts that failed to mask their impotence when confronted with paroxysm of criticising the obsolete. The fact is sobering and simple, we do not need techno-capitalist Empire, judeo-masonic lodges or global state

¹⁹ ID., *Science of Logic*, cit., p. 117.

²⁰ K.N. WALTZ, *Theory of International Politics*, Waveland Press, Long Grove 1979.

²¹ D. MANN, *Structural Idealism: A Theory of Social and Historical Explanation*, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo 2002.

²² See for instance R.K. ASHLEY, *Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique*, in «Millennium: Journal of International Studies», XVII, 2 (1988), pp. 227-262.

²³ A.W. NEIL, *Neophilia*, in «Security Dialogue», L, 45 (2019), p. 10.

²⁴ A. BADIOU, *The Meaning of Sarkozy*, trans. by D. Fernbach, Verso, New York 2008, p. 50.

of plague, source of the problem lies beyond, before the very beginning of IR.

Waltz famously divided levels of research and possible causes of war on three images: individual, state and international anarchy.²⁵ The reason why his theory is called structural realism is that he prescribed lack of a higher order(er) above the states as a governing feature of IR. Namely, instead of it functioning as a system, it is a unit of structures whose behavior is resembling clinamen. A unit of structures is obviously on a lower functional level than system because the former does not envisage symbiosis for the sake of preserving the whole. Otherwise said, the third Waltzian image or the international anarchy represents at the same time the non-existence of order, but also of any structure that would govern it, any orderer whatsoever.²⁶ Therefore, the nature of the state actors is egoistic, that of self-help within the given constraints. Critiques missing the point predominantly claim that this theory precludes states from organising themselves into a system which would negate anarchy. Further research should be oriented towards the second image being unwilling to negate it. To use Plato's terminology, states are missing the arche to govern, even the arche of anarchy which is certainly negatively constituted. As a famous dictum goes: «International anarchy is the permissive cause of war»²⁷. Chances are that not the anarchy, but the state structures are the actual permissive cause. As in the initial lines of Hegel's parable, the unequal relation is given, which can only partly be attributed to «[...] two opposed shapes of consciousness»²⁸, yet partly and necessarily also to the subjective leanings of the two characters, recondemning themselves to a relationship where one is too little and two or more is too many.

Here we claim that the three images are display of racism of the structure, that of categorization and superiority. First image is utterly disregarded as a minor element of the structure, unimportant noise of domestic politics and tamed sovereignty, representing both internal challenges and internal solutions. Second image is the key where

²⁵ K.N. WALTZ, *Man, the State, and War*, Columbia University Press, New York 2001, p. 12.

²⁶ Ivi, pp. 159-161.

²⁷ Ivi, p. 234.

²⁸ G.W.F. HEGEL, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, cit., p. 115.

the principle of national survival is elevated into the governing ethical postulate of the IR. Therefore, we do not need to discuss lack of physical race in structural realism, but to draw attention to physical reality of structural racism. And that reality is superiority of a structure over the allegedly superior unit of structures. As can be inferred, not the theory itself, but the second image is to be accused of preventing anarchy from disappearing, racist structure encumbered in keeping racism as a sole guarantee of its existence. As the story goes, consciousness simply needs to unfold as subordination caught in a cleft stick between the cause of inequality and a by-product of the movements of its single parts or manifestations.

A passage from Deleuze and Guattari reads:

The race-tribe exists only at the level of an oppressed race, and in the name of the oppression it suffers: there is no race but inferior, minoritarian; there is no dominant race; a race is defined not by its purity but rather by the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination²⁹.

If we closely follow the line of thought, there is an absolute transcendence of the phenotypic and physiognomic notions of race. It is not race of the skin colour or shape of the skull, it is difference *eo ipso*. Therefore, we can see the two opposite views on the problem of constitution of race. Deleuze and Guattari consider it as a consequence, shaped by external factors, a term prone to structural permeation. Its principle owes to the system of domination and that is why it is always marked by impurity. To employ Derridean dictionary: there is no such a thing as a good race. On the other side, Saldanha claims that there exists viscosity of race, a fusion of IR science and political practices internally shaping what we today know as race. As viscosity in natural science does, here the notion is practically free from external interference. Saldanha dictates that viscosity is a useful concept because it «[...] allows for a fundamentally spatial way of imagining race, as opposed to collapsing it into a disembodied and

²⁹ G. DELEUZE, F. GUATTARI, *Nomadology: The War Machine*, trans. by B. Massumi, Wormwood Distribution, Seattle 2010 [1980], p. 42.

mental contraption»³⁰. If we add relative impermeability³¹, we can see why race can be seen as a reflection of intra- and inter-group dynamics, but free from the systemic burden. Nonetheless, this approach is too reductionist and it cannot withstand the notion of race on a level more refined than a set of human characteristics.

Finally, impurity and negative nature are the conditions of racial existence. Being formed by centrifugal force, it does not exist as a constitutive, but rather as a regulative idea, a race artificially produced to be the exact race one needs. And the science of IR heavily relied on the situational semantics precisely because the structural contingency opened the horizons of meaning. In other words, maybe brutal but certainly necessary, international relations are a by-product of the impurity of race, aborted child which did not have a chance to grow and develop. Viscosity is an important characteristic but solely in terms of not allowing outside agents to diminish its importance. For example, subaltern studies, feminism and others under the guise of breaking with the old, actually reconfirmed the incumbent paradigm.³² All of those missed the key point: the term itself and implications are not the problem; order of things is. Oppression cannot be interpreted as a consequence of the racism, because the two are synonyms. In as much as geopolitics, globalization, hyper-connectivity or democracy are. And they are all identical, formed by impurity and conducted by those who are not aware of the origins because the history of race has been written by those who dominated. Hegel writes: «[...] one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another. The former is lord, the other is bondsman»³³.

What usually comes first, here is deliberately put at the end. Many writers attempted to define race, but barely anyone managed to

³⁰ A. SALDANHA, *Psychedelic White Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2007, p. 10.

³¹ Ivi, p. 5.

³² See for instance J. WALTON, *Re-Placing Race in (White) Psychoanalytic Discourse: Founding Narratives of Feminism*, in «Critical Inquiry», XXI, 4 (1995), pp. 775-804; H. WINANT, *Race and racism: Towards a global future*, in «Ethnic and Racial Studies», XXIX, 5 (2006), pp. 986-1003.

³³ G.W.F. HEGEL, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, cit., p. 115.

avoid using relational ontologies as an analytically shallow concept if it is not used as an end in itself. For example, Oppenheimer claims that race is a result of migratory movements³⁴; Simpson and Yinger negatively define racism as something different from ethnocentrism³⁵; Snowden expands the correlation between slavery and race³⁶... Not even to mention a whole array of phenotypical, biological and geographical definitions. However, none of them answers what race actually is. Two are the possible explanations for this. First, none of the researchers came up with a proper idea and referential framework. Second, it is not possible at all to define race. Answering to this set of questions warrants race and racism *tout court* as useful heuristics. To that aim, a typical modern definition of race sees it as a phenotype, but also a socio-historical development³⁷, all while increasingly admitting the relational aspect of any such initially biodeterministic formulation, the always-already present (t)race of the other³⁸. As concerns racism, a (vertical) question of power and domination most often supplements such a (horizontal) categorical sub-division: «the infliction of unequal consideration, motivated by the desire to dominate, based on race alone»³⁹.

The first option leaves us with the notion of racism as an ideology and race as a social construct. Hirschman claims that racist ideology has evolved in three steps: enslavement of Africa, spread of European rule, development of Social Darwinism⁴⁰. The permanently present question of this article is whether we are spending time discussing ephemeral and marginal issues. Yet, the ideology of racism is nothing more than racism of ideology. In other words, there is no

³⁴ S. OPPENHEIMER, *Eden in the East: The Drowned Continent of Southeast Asia*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1998.

³⁵ G.E. SIMPSON, J.M. YINGER, *Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination*, Plenum Press, New York 1985.

³⁶ F.M. SNOWDEN JR., *Before Color Prejudice: The Ancient View of Blacks*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1983.

³⁷ M. OMI, H. WINANT, *Racial formation in the United States: from the 1960s to the 1990s*, cit., p. 55.

³⁸ See for instance J. GLASGOW, *A Theory of Race*, cit.; S. VUCETIC, R.B. PERSAUD, *Race in International Relations*, cit.

³⁹ T.W. SCHMID, *The definition of racism*, cit., p. 34.

⁴⁰ C. HIRSCHMAN, *The Origins and Demise of the Concept of Race*, in «Population and Development Review», XXX, 3 (2004), pp. 385-415.

such a thing as a racism put pragmatically in a relational constitutive role. As we already saw, it is a regulative idea that becomes constitutive solely in transcending the very science. The definition of race is (im)possible because it comes before the apparatus which has the duty to define it. As in every religion, God is beyond cognition except in its emanations through humans or sacred objects. Here, race cannot be defined in the words of the science of international relations. On the brink of solipsism, we claim that race defines and enables IR as we know it. In other words, the science of international relations must be defined in the words of racism. As could be imagined, the language of racism we cannot fully comprehend since it counteracts our presuppositions about the question of subject. With the risk of extreme simplification, we can say that it is the race of difference and the race of domination.

Finally, Derrida's dictum about Apartheid goes:

[N]o tongue has ever translated this name, as if all the languages of the world were defending themselves, shutting their mouths against a sinister incorporation of the thing by means of the word, as if all tongues were refusing to give an equivalent, refusing to let themselves be contaminated through the contagious hospitality of the word-for-word⁴¹.

Exactly the same is valid for the bigger picture as well. International relations can be read both denotative, but also as a metaphor of the Royal Science in the Deleuzian sense, the whole generally accepted scientific apparatus with all its dogmas, paradigms, and paradoxes. Race has been pushed to the borders of science, in the darkest of all the corners just because putting it below and beyond the very possibility of cognition would be a mortal blow.

3. *Race Without Racism: First as a Tragedy*

That there is autarchic structuralism does not impede cooperation between states. Put plainly, this is the essence of the liberal internationalist current in IR, accepting and sharing realism's reliance upon structures, yet less so its accent on ensuing competition. As a

⁴¹ J. DERRIDA, *Racism's Last Word*, in «Critical Inquiry», 12 (1985), pp. 290-299.

matter of fact, anarchy forms no pretext for power politics, as states may well institutionalise irenic patterns of behaviour⁴². Interestingly, the resulting liberal internationalism's buzzword, namely "complex interdependence", originally stood for the irreducible mutual dependence of, *inter alia*, races⁴³.

It is no coincidence then that later synthetic attempts in IR theory inherited this schism over the moral code of states *qua* races. Remarkably, the bridge-building English School was profoundly shaken by the transformative decade of the 1990s. For instance, it divided around the question of human rights: on the one hand, pluralism maintained that human rights represented no serious challenge for national states, hence gaining prominence only as fundamentally their own prerogative⁴⁴; on the other hand, solidarism interpreted that same growing prominence of human rights discourse as a result of rather transnational relations and practices, beyond and above the state⁴⁵. Playing with a swinging pendulum, one could hence speak of the realist foundations of the pluralist English School and of the liberal internationalist inspiration of its solidarist current.

Against this general background, IR branches and sub-branches had themselves to adapt to the tectonic shifts of the early 1990s. As the leading SS scholars at the time noted, one after another, SS were facing a "security puzzle"⁴⁶, namely the decadence of the branch's very *raison d'être*, reinvented only through the allegedly superior

⁴² See for instance R. KEOHANE, J. NYE, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Little, Brown, Boston 1977; R. KEOHANE, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984.

⁴³ R.L. BUELL, *International Relations*, Henry Holt and Co, New York 1925.

⁴⁴ See for instance J.R. VINCENT, *Human Rights and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986; M. FINNEMORE, *Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention*, in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. by P.J. Katzenstein, Columbia University Press, New York 1996, pp. 153-185.

⁴⁵ N. WHEELER, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000.

⁴⁶ H. HAFTENDORN, *The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security*, in «International Studies Quarterly», 35, 1 (1991), pp. 3-17.

marginal utility of the human, as it were⁴⁷. In this, CSS played a famously important role, by attaching the adjective critical to SS, to designate emancipatory approaches counterposed to traditional, military security affairs, rather than meta-theory *vis-à-vis* the policy-making orientation of SS⁴⁸, clearly inspired by the distinction between traditional and critical theory in Horkheimer (1937) and the followers. It was at this point that the concept of the “human” brought fame to the new generation of SS scholars: «[...] treat people as ends and not means. States [...] should be treated as means and not ends»⁴⁹. In a continuation of our Hegelian reading, a strong antithesis is under way: it is not the bondsman which is necessary to the lord, but the other way around. Translating the universal parable into IR language, out of the four elements of the state, as it were, defined by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, viz. internal and eternal sovereignty, territory and population, it is the latter which reclaims the social contract through which it has originally been subordinated. Before long, population as the collective condition of the human unchained from autarchic structuralism committed to a self-fulfilling redemption of the one and only race so obscured before the ethical imperative of the 21st century global moral science. Hegel called it ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), the progressive vertical ascension of the collective moral, the ethical, from the family, through the civil society and towards the state as the ultimate instance of ethical life, although concluding sub-sections of the *Philosophy of Right* do leave room for further instantiation of ethical life.

This new human-centered agenda was timely and pertinent at a time in which intra-state violence was (mis)diagnosed as simply as state failure⁵⁰, acquitting states such as the 1994 Rwanda from any

⁴⁷ D.A. BALDWIN, *Review: Security Studies and the End of the Cold War*, in «World Politics», XLVIII, 4 (1995), pp. 117-141.

⁴⁸ R.W. COX, *Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*, in «Millennium: Journal of International Studies», X, 2 (1981), pp. 126-155.

⁴⁹ K. BOOTH, *Security and Emancipation*, in «Review of International Studies», XVII, 4 (1991), pp. 313-326.

⁵⁰ See for instance G.B. HELMAN, S.R. RATNER, *Saving Failed States*, in «Foreign Policy», LXXXIX (1992-3), pp. 3-20; A.A. MAZRUI, *The Blood of Experience: The Failed State and Political Collapse in Africa*, in «World Policy Journal», XII, 1

responsibility for grave international crimes⁵¹, or at a time when other forms of state racism, such as slavery, immigration exclusion, imperialism, the Holocaust, the South African apartheid and so on, were either understudied or ignored⁵². The forlorn social contract aroused growing interest to the benefit of the individual and mostly so through the concept of human security, defined as «[...] a concern with human life and dignity. [...] chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression [...] and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities»⁵³. At this point in time, the state, once a racialised recipient of self-help communities, became the *persona non grata* in its own home, at least as long as sovereignty is understood as contingent upon the respect of human rights⁵⁴. Naive as it may seem, the newborn cosmopolitan self *qua* the human race eventually led to the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), with jurisdiction over grave international crimes such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity, rather than the R2P as a high-level institutionalisation of intermestic sovereignty in case of inability of single states to protect their own citizens or populations⁵⁵, while both were intended to combat any plausible *hostis humanis generis* (enemy of the mankind) ruining the aspiring or actual homeostasis. In turn, recent

(1995), pp. 28-34; W.I. ZARTMAN, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 1995.

⁵¹ M. BØAS, K. JENNINGS, *Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the 'Failed State'*, in «European Journal of Development Research», XVII, 3 (2005), pp. 385-395.

⁵² See for instance P.G. LAUREN, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination*, Westview, Boulder 1996; K. NISANCIOGLU, *Racial Sovereignty*, cit.

⁵³ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, UNDP, New York 1994.

⁵⁴ A.J. BELLAMY, *Responsibility to Protect*, Polity, Cambridge 2009.

⁵⁵ See for instance F. FOX, *New Humanitarianism: Does It Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st Century?*, in «Disasters», XXV, 4 (2001), pp. 275-289; D. HUBERT, *An Idea that Works in Practice*, in «Security Dialogue», XXXV, 3 (2004), pp. 351-352; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect*, International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa 2001; United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). *World Summit Outcome*, A/RES/60/1, UNGA, New York 2005.

scholarly contributions quite counterintuitively changed the analytical levels in the study of race from national to global or transnational, both as concerns historical development⁵⁶ and the present moment⁵⁷. Conversely, the frequent uncritical inspiration with Kantian universalism, for instance, has recently warranted a recapitulation of an important proviso to the idea of absolute hospitality⁵⁸. Whereas this is described as the moment at which the bondsman becomes aware of the potential inherent to the self-consciousness of the ‘We’⁵⁹, they still cannot reclaim other than a unity in diversity, an unhappy unity, to paraphrase Hegel. In turn, this difficulty of being to determine its indeterminacy is best described by Hegel through a quote of Jacobi’s *Treatise Concerning the Undertaking of Critique to Reduce Reason to the Understanding*, namely: «Let space be *a one*; time *a one*; consciousness *a one*. Now, do say how any of these three ‘ones’ *purely* turns itself internally into a manifold [...]»⁶⁰. Similarly, once universality is reclaimed, it is ruined in the same act by the permanent temporary exemption of the beholder. Temporary, because the beholder needs to return to the universality yet to materialise; and permanent because without such a temporary exemption, universality cannot be reclaimed. Accordingly, it turns out to be its own desire for recognition and realisation.

4. *Race Without Racism: Then As a Farce*

The theory and practice of IR are then currently heading in no clear direction. This is arguably the synthetic moment, which notwithstanding its sublative aura really produces major complexity

⁵⁶ D. THOMPSON, *Through, against and beyond the racial state: the transnational stratum of race*, in «Cambridge Review of International Affairs», XXVI, 1 (2014), pp. 133-151.

⁵⁷ D.F. DA SILVA, *Towards a Global Idea of Race*, Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis 2007.

⁵⁸ J.K. GANI, *The Erasure of Race: Cosmopolitanism and the Illusion of Kantian Hospitality*, in «Millennium: Journal of International Studies», XLV, 3 (2017), pp. 425-446; J. DERRIDA, *Of Hospitality*, cit.

⁵⁹ S. HOULGATE, *Why Does the Development of Self-Consciousness in Hegel’s “Phenomenology” Make “Recognition” Necessary?*, in «Archivio di filosofia», LXXVII, 2-3 (2009), pp. 13-20.

⁶⁰ Quoted in G.W.F. HEGEL, *Science of Logic*, cit., p. 71.

rather than clarity. Assisted by the parable, we may say that this is the moment in which self-consciousness comes full circle in the lord's realisation that they are themselves dependent object of desire in a struggle to life superseding the one to death. Self-consciousness is absolute, both the lord and the bondsman have gone through the stages of both objectification and subjectivisation, leaving behind no relation as a simple possession, but rather a doom to relation which now holds sway over *its* subjects. At this stage, human security as the war horse of the human race *qua* ecumenical citizenry or the trans-national community of individuals⁶¹ has been co-opted into such a framework which could be, hitherto perhaps oxymoronicly, dubbed "state human security"⁶², returning at the same time as a prerogative of states, yet with stripped exclusivity of such a reality. To be honest, that may come as no surprise since the first head of state or government self-confidently fixed their fringe at the entrance mirrors of the UN headquarters in New York prior to the World Summit of September 2005, or even earlier, in San Francisco, April 1945, as some rather prefer to recount.⁶³ More recent considerations of the kind do not lack, either, in a third way which would want *Realpolitik* and power politics to be inextricably linked with however compelling or morally solid imperative of humanitarianism.

Indeed, partly because of policy-making aspirations of critical theorists within SS⁶⁴, partly because of the impracticality of light-hearted theoretical assumptions, a prominent international institution, the World Bank (WB), shook almost no one with the recent gloss "citizen" rather than "human" security⁶⁵, allowing precisely to bring the state back in into a once upon a time emancipatory

⁶¹ M. BANTON, *The International Politics*, cit.

⁶² E. NEWMAN, *Human Security: Reconciling Critical Aspirations With Political Realities*, in «The British Journal of Criminology», LVI, 6 (2016), pp. 1165-1183.

⁶³ See for instance R. SEYMOUR, *The Cold War, American Anticommunism and the Global 'Colour Line'*, in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line*, cit., 157-175.

⁶⁴ N. HYNEK, D. CHANDLER, *No Emancipatory Alternative, No Critical Security Studies*, cit.

⁶⁵ World Bank (WB), *World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development*, WB, Washington 2011.

discourse. *The* state, although more appropriate would be to state *a* state, a yet another state, a state now more self-conscious of its inescapable embeddedness in international relations rather than dominion over them. In as much as the citizen reclaiming human security from the social contract in the 1990s was not the Hobbesian citizen, today's state is itself the state of a rejuvenated social contract, reclaiming in turn its right to revised terms of interference.

The international security governance is changing, from global interventionism, allegedly resolute, centralised and universal, into global self-policing, decentralised, local and plural⁶⁶, the irony of faith being the merger of hitherto irreconcilable positions and further complexity down the road when it comes to the subjects and objects of such relationships. From domestic to international and, lately, intermestic setup, little explicit change there is for the chthonic realms of race and racism, unless their condition of possibility is understood as precisely the condition of possibility of IR itself. It is their incalculability which ultimately enables and undermines the quest for a unitary cosmopolitan self and the utopian human race. If so, the question then inevitably becomes the following: Is it too late in history to say that our cosmopolitan self is inherently racist?

5. Conclusion

Here we start over and here we conclude, without however reaching the end. The Truth and the Absolute have consummated themselves progressively, yet intentionally with no clear beginning and even less clear an end. Indeed, at no point in time have we claimed to know the precise point of beginning of the process, apart from deliberately choosing to follow the oft-recounted history of the discipline, all while instilling doubt in its very mechanism, the doubt of structure as race and even racism. In the same way, this conclusion heads nowhere clear, *unless Aufhebung* is understood as a moment which can appropriate the either/or duality of the thesis and the

⁶⁶ D. CHANDLER, *New Narratives of International Security Governance: the Shift from Global Interventionism to Global Self-Policing*, in «Global Crime», XVII, 3-4 (2016), pp. 264-280.

antithesis only insofar as rising above this logic, hence exceeding it in a gesture which ultimately translates the either/or into the neither/nor and both/and⁶⁷.

In this sense, the aim of this intervention was to transcend the notion of race as one of the objects of study within the domain of international relations discipline, if not more broadly. Moving it away, making the difference, ultimately means being critical. In disturbing the mainstream conjuncture we ask whether race precedes (the *scire* of) science. In other words, the very totalising scientific perspective is being treated as racist.

Moreover, we go beyond race: «If we may assume that ... race is reducible to biologico-naturalist schemas ... the question of racism is neither raised nor is it necessary»⁶⁸. Oscillating between autarchic and ecumenical, exceptional and cosmopolitan, race is not attributable, but defining. Attempts to assign a set of relational ontologies fail since there is no such a thing as a relational racism. Racism is a relation in itself.

Finally, we dig deeper into race in order to proclaim it as a powerful tool of fighting against racism. Deleuze reads: «Difference is included in repetition by way of disguise and by the order of the symbol»⁶⁹. Many would say that race and racism are compatible, but in being internally similar, extrinsic factor becomes even more relevant. Race is racist in as much as racism is racial. There is no identity present, just reflections and deflections in a constitution of a convex dynamic striated space. Racist cosmopolitanism and autarchic structural racism here are just purveyors of difference. *Geschlecht* in all its magnificent shine: so many same meanings, so many different identities.

⁶⁷ See for instance B.C. BIRCHALL, *Hegel's notion of Aufheben*, in «Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy», XXIV, 1 (2008), pp. 75-103; B. RADNIK, *Hegel on Double Movement of Aufhebung*, in «Continental Thought and Theory: A journal of intellectual freedom», I, 1 (2016), pp. 194-206.; B. ARFI, *Khôra as the condition of possibility of the ontological without ontology*, in «Review of International Studies», XXXVIII, 1 (2012), pp. 191-207.

⁶⁸ J. DERRIDA, *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, vol. II, ed. by P. Kamuf, E.G. Rottenberg, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2008 [1987], p. 254.

⁶⁹ G. DELEUZE, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. by P. Patton, Columbia University Press, New York 1994 [1968].

Our racism is that of categorisation and superiority. To be even more direct, racism of difference and Difference. It is a zero institution of international relations, where the signifier and signified meet to constitute the (im)possibility of a non-racist science. But again, the racist of no race. We must be ready to embrace it, particularly being critical about racist singularity: «What is going on is, moreover, each time idiomatic: each time, it's a nation, a people, a language, a minority that struggles or fights in the name of these structurally phantasmatic motives»⁷⁰. A struggle which is always-already lost by being immersed in the matrix of cocooned primordial instincts of a failed science.

In the end, again a different repetition, it is not a problem of concepts, researchers, theories and institutions fighting racism with race and being critical in advocating for a non-racist science. The problem is that even a critical, altruistic non-racist science originates from a racist apparatus. Racism is a structural necessity (or haecceity), a jurist-priest and a magician-king of the discipline. Perhaps IR is not so different in judging the difference. Perhaps IR is not so dominant in condemning domination. Perhaps IR is not possible without both.

⁷⁰ J. DERRIDA, B. STIEGLER, *Ecographies of Television*, trans. by J. Bajorek, Polity, Cambridge 2002 [1996], p. 79.